K9APE’S BOOKSHELF

K9APE’S BOOKSHELF

Shel Epstein

Under The Wire

How The Telegraph Changed Diplomacy

David Paul Nickles

Now that Morse Code proficiency is no longer a serious barrier to entry into Amateur Radio, this is a good time to review its history – or at least a part of it, David Nickles’ book titled Under The Wire - How The Telegraph Changed Diplomacy is a thoughtful and well document review of the history of major power diplomacy impacted by telegraph technology from the beginning of international telegraphy in 1851 with completion of a cable under the English Channel to its end in 2000 by the British Foreign Office.

Nickles describes a typical early 19^th century diplomat as coming from the aristocratic class and having no desire or skill for the trades or professions; but, wanting a job or career that would not interfere with his (there are no women diplomats mentioned) pursuits of travel, women, wine, gambling, hobbies or the arts. Ambassadors and staff were chosen for their family connections and their willingness to finance their appointments – or at least work cheaply. As they were posted far from home, they were largely left to their own devices.

Ambassadors spent little time in their embassies and left most routine matters to their staffs. When confronted with responsibilities during, international crises, these emissaries acted largely on their own initiative in representing their governments’ positions and –often as not– chose to follow or disregard instructions they received. Instructions were purposely vague because their authors knew that during a month or more that delivery required, situations could change. Thus, Foreign Offices expected their ambassadors to use their judgment in settling disputers and Ambassadors viewed themselves as personal emissaries of their sovereigns and who needed no bureaucratic guidance. In any case, diplomacy was a gentlemen’s club where displeasure was to be avoided and passage of time was viewed as a great healer. All of this was to change with the introduction of the telegraph.

The telegraph disrupted the rhythm of aristocratic diplomacy in several important aspects. First, telegraphs could arrive at any moment and, the greater the distance from the Foreign Office, the greater the likelihood they would arrive after hours. Second, telegraphs forced aristocrats to hold regular communications with lower classes of Foreign Office bureaucracy and therefore diminished the importance of an ambassador – at least in his own mind. Third, the telegraph forced a change in the content of communications between diplomats and this is, perhaps, it’s most important effect.

You perhaps remember an old joke about ‘What is a major difference between a lady and a diplomat?’ Answer: When a lady says ‘No’, she means ‘Maybe’ and when she says ‘Maybe’ she means ‘Yes. And if she says ‘Yes’, then she is no lady. When a diplomat say ‘Yes’, he means ‘Maybe’ and when he says ‘Maybe’, he means ‘No. And if he says ‘No’, then he is no diplomat. And not saying ‘No’ is primarily what diplomacy is all about.

In pre-telegraph days, diplomats could avoid saying ‘No’ by asking for time to receive instructions from their sovereigns. Long delays provided time for crises to be resolved peacefully without forceful intervention. One such case was the “Trent Affair” that took place in 1861 during our Civil War. Two Confederate diplomats broke through a Union blockade and reached Cuba where they boarded a British mail steamer named ‘Trent’. Trent was intercepted by a Union Navy ship, which took the two diplomats prisoner. Great Britain threatened war unless the Union apologized and the prisoners were freed; however, delays in communications allowed time for passions to cool and Union diplomats to meet British demands without incurring heavy political costs.

Nickels provides other examples of the telegraph’s impact on diplomatic communications by defining four message attributes that affect message content; namely cost, accuracy (garbling), security and speed. What I, as a Navy – Marine Corp Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) operator found most interesting was the difference in priority of these four attributes between diplomats and the military. MARS operators are trained to rank order the attributes as accuracy, security, speed and cost. Diplomats, however, rank order them as speed, cost, accuracy and security!

Diplomats were mainly concerned with speed and cost because Foreign Offices feared first learning of events from adversaries or newspapers rather than their embassies and telegraph expenses ate significant percentages of diplomatic costs. Accuracy in messages –be they telegraphic or mail dispatches- was always a problem; however, the pressure of costs was so great that it forced diplomats to learn to write messages that were concise – if not always accurate. As for security, many diplomats had no conception of circuit discipline and tended to violate all major rules for protecting codes and code books.

The book contains several excellent examples of diplomatic crises and successes impacted by the telegraph. ‘The Zimmerman Telegram’ of World War I from Germany to Mexico containing a promise of assistance in recovering parts of the Southwest is perhaps one of the best known examples. Some of its details are contained in my review of Harold Yardley’s ‘American Black Chamber’ that appeared in the September 2002 edition of The Transmitter. Also, see Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram, ©1958 for more details.

While Nickles provides a short description of the ‘Fourteen Points’ declaration of war telegram sent by the Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura in Washington just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Nickles cites it as an example of what can happen when there is a late delivery of a message. He fails to mention a series of telegrams sent to Ambassador Nomura leading up to 07 DEC 1941. These telegrams were enciphered by the Japanese Purple Machine and believed to be unbreakable. Nevertheless, William Friedman of the Army Security Agency deciphered them and translated them into English – or almost translated them.

Friedman et al taught themselves Japanese; however, they were unaware that diplomatic or Emperor’s Japanese is different from conversational or literary Japanese. The translators confused the ‘double-negative’ of Imperial Japanese with the ‘single-negative’ of ordinary Japanese and hence wrote ‘No’ or ‘Disagree’ where they should have written “Yes’ or ‘Agree’ in transcripts given to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. (See John Toland, ‘The Rising Sun’ © 1970.) Hull read those transcripts prior to receiving Nomura and that is the reason Hull became convinced during their meetings that Nomura was lying to him. (See ‘Memoirs of Cordell Hull’ reprinted 1993.) While war with Japan could not have been avoided by diplomacy, it is clear that mistranslation was the reason for President Roosevelt’s declaration to Congress that ‘Yesterday, 7 December 1941-a date which will live in infamy’.

In conclusion, I strongly recommend ‘Under The Wire’ (as well as other books cited above) for those interested in diplomacy and policy formulation. ‘Under The Wire’ is especially timely as we review recent events in the Middle East – if for no other reason than to show how messages intercepted, messages garbled and messages delayed or messages lost affect the course of international events.